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ABOVE ALL, DO NO HARM: THE





The concept of national security is difficult to define. Even during
the height of the Cold War, when we lived in a strictly bipolar world
and it was clear which countries fell into which camp, debate raged
over how best to protect our national security. In this historic era,
marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the concept of national
military security can be easily overwhelmed by slogans of national eco-
nomic security, which often champion trade protectionism.' As U.S.
military security seems less in peril, the attention of the voting public
turns inward to economic issues.2 The political climate is ripe for a
new presidential administration to misuse trade legislation designed to
protect the physical and military security of the United States solely
for the purpose of trade protectionism. 3 In response to this growing
possibility, the European Community (EC) and its Member States re-
cently issued a joint declaration expressing their concern over possible
U.S. protectionism. 4
* Michigan State University, B.A. 1986; Auburn University, M.B.A. 1990; University of
Michigan Law School, Class of 1993; former U.S. Air Force Officer. The author is deeply in-
debted to Professor William J. Adams for his insight and encouragement.
1. Two of this year's major party candidates for president have adopted protectionism as a
key campaign issue. See William Neikirk, Pat and Jerry, the High Priests of Protectionism, CHI.
TRIR., Mar. 18, 1992, at C21; Donald Lambro, Buchanan Sees GOP as Adrift, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1992, at A6. See also Norma Greenaway, There's a New Patriotic Fervor Afoot in the
United States-The Push is on to "Buy American," OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 28, 1992, at B4;
John Schwartz et al., The Push to Buy American, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at 32. For a histori-
cal view see David Bercuson, U.S. Retreats Into Isolationism Again, FIN. POST, Mar. 23, 1992,
§ 4, at 2.
2. See Lance Morrow, Voters are Mad as Hell, TIME, Mar. 2, 1992, at 17, 20. For a thought-
ful discussion of the underlying economic trends causing this "new protectionism," see Jagdish
N. Baghwati, United States Policy at the Crossroads, 12 WORLD ECON. 439 (1989).
3. See Edward Felsenthal, Threat to the Republic? The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States, 14 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 354 (1990). There have even been argu-
ments that foreign direct investment in the United States represents an unacceptable influence on
U.S. culture, particularly with regard to treatment of minorities and women. See William H.
Lash III, Unwelcome Imports. Racism, Sexism, and Foreign Investment, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. I
(1991).
4. Statement by the European Community and its Member States Regarding U.S. Policy on
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The EC's concern is over legislation currently in place which gives
the president of the United States the power to block any transaction
which threatens to impair national security. Known as the Exon-
Florio Amendment to the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill,' the statute is
aimed at protecting two elements of national security: maintaining a
domestic defense industrial base to ensure our ability to rapidly build
up our military in times of need, and preventing the transfer of sensi-
tive military technologies to unfriendly nations.
6
Legislation has been introduced, however, which should give the
EC and others supporting free trade even greater cause for concern.
7
Specifically, the Technology Preservation Act,8 introduced June 12,
1991 by Representative Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.) and co-sponsored by
fourteen other members of the House, including House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), 9 proposes changes to key provi-
sions of the Exon-Florio Amendment with the intent of strengthening
its enforcement. 10
Foreign Direct Investment, RAPID PRESS RELEASE, Feb. 18, 1992. Despite the recent focus on
Japanese investment, the European Community, not Japan, is the largest overseas investor in the
United States. As of the end of 1990, the EC held $229.9 billion in direct investments in the
United States. The three largest direct investors are the United Kingdom, holding $108.1 billion,
Japan with $83.5 billion, and the Netherlands, with $64 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS 54 (Aug. 1991).
5. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat.
1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, § 721, 50
U.S.C. app. 2158). The Exon-Florio Amendment, named after its principal sponsors, Sen. J.
James Exon (D-Neb.) and Rep. James J. Florio (D-N.J.), actually expired on Oct. 20, 1990;
however, on Aug. 17, 1991 President Bush signed H.R. 991, providing for permanent
reauthorization of the amendment. Bush Signs Defense Measure Making Exon-Florio Perma-
nent, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1248 (Aug. 21, 1991).
6. A third element considered by the Department of Defense (DOD) is the protection of
industrial security through the protection of classified information and material. Bush Expected
to Sign Bill Making Exon-Florio Permanent, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Aug. 15, 1991) (Com-
ments of G. Christopher Griner, former official in the DOD Office of the General Counsel).
7. But see Chance of Protectionist Legislation in 1992 Is Zero, Professor Predicts, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (Feb. 28, 1992) (quoting American University Professor Stephen Cohen, who ar-
gued that "[t]he U.S. electorate will not buy a candidate selling across the board protectionism").
8. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Other legislation has been introduced to accom-
plish the same goal. See The Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act of 1991, H.R. REP.
No. 2386, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), introduced by Reps. Mel Levine (D-Ca.) and Frank Wolf
(R-Va.), as reported in Bill Offered To Strengthen Law Governing' Foreign Acquisitions, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 947 (June 19, 1991).
9. Bill Offered to Strengthen Law Governing Foreign Acquisitions, supra note 8.
10. Key provisions of the bill which would strengthen enforcement are: 1) chairmanship of
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) would be transferred to the
Commerce Department, see discussion infra at notes 42-46 and accompanying text; 2) the De-
partments of Commerce and Defense would be required to collect, analyze, and present informa-
tion on proposed mergers and acquisitions to the CFIUS; 3) the Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology would make a recommendation to the President regarding the acquisi-
tion's impact on the national security; 4) the President would have direct authority to order the
"unwinding" of transactions as opposed to ordering divestment, thus possibly requiring the seller
of an affected firm to repurchase the firm from the buyer; 5) the President would be required to
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As it currently stands, Exon-Florio is a powerful and not yet fully
tested weapon which, put to the wrong use, could deprive the U.S.
defense industry of exactly the vital commodities the bill was designed
to protect.1 ' As amended by the Technology Preservation Act, Exon-
Florio could become a powerful disincentive to foreign investment in
any U.S. industry having national defense implications.1 2
Some have argued that the president should block transactions
that relate to so-called dual-use technologies-technologies which
have both military and civilian uses, e.g., computer microchips or civil
aviation technology. ' 3 Their argument is ostensibly based on the idea
that the core of a strong national defense is a strong national econ-
omy,1 4 but when examined critically, their argument is reduced to the
assumption that if protection of any defense industry is good, protec-
tion of all defense industries is good. This Note will argue that such a
use of the Exon-Florio Amendment would actually damage the na-
tional security, and that in attempting to protect the national security
the president should follow the prudent warning of the Hippocratic
oath: Above all, do no harm.' 5 The harm that may be done by strict
compile a report regarding the extent to which foreign investment in the United States impacts
national security; and 6) the bill specifically exempts foreign investment in new production facili-
ties from Exon-Florio review. Technology Preservation Act of 1991, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. REP. No. 399(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
11. Samuel Fromartz, Law on Foreign Buyouts Assailed as a Potential Trade Weapon, Reuter
Bus. Rep., Dec. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT File.
12. David Tirr, a high-ranking European Community official, explained the EC's position on
this subject in a recent press briefing. He said that the ambiguity surrounding the application of
Exon-Florio, particularly with regard to its failure to define national security and its lack of a
statute of limitations, has "provoked a great deal of uncertainty" for companies investing in the
United States. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated with Exon-Florio, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Feb. 19, 1992).
13. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990) (Testimony of
Howard D. Samuel, President, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, and Clyde Prestowitz,
President, Economic Strategy Institute). See also SARA L. GORDON & FRANCIS A. LEES, FOR-
EIGN MULTI-NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1986). Gordon and Lees do
not specifically use the term "dual-use technology," but their broad approach to a defense-based
foreign direct investment policy clearly includes such technologies within its ambit. Id. at 198-
203.
14. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra note 18 (Testimony of Howard D. Samuel,
President, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO). A prime example of the force of this argu-
ment is the recent events in the former Soviet Union. For a more esoteric view of the demise of
communism, see Michael Dobbs, Soviet System Was Eroded From Within. Onslaught of Common
Sense Ends Bolsheviks' Historic Experiment, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1991, at Al.
15. The relevant text of the Hippocratic Oath reads:
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judge-
ment; I will keep them from harm and injustice. I will neither give a deadly drug to any-
body if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a
woman an abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.
VINCENT BARRY, MORAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE 500 (1982). Similarly, an oath formu-
lated by Florence Nightingale pledges: "I will abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischie-
Exon-Florio Amendment
enforcement of the Exon-Florio Amendment, or by passage of the
Technology Preservation Act, is that the domestic industries meant to
be protected will actually be put at a competitive disadvantage and
eventually lose to overseas competitors.
The mechanism by which this harm would occur is as follows:
dual-use technologies, by definition, are freely traded in the open mar-
ket and thus are subject to market forces in a way that strictly military
technologies are not. In the open market, capital flows to its most
productive uses, and therefore the most productive firms can and will
attract foreign investors. If these investors are unable to invest in in-
dustries located within the United States, they may invest in the same
industries overseas. This would weaken the United States' defense in-
dustrial base by subjecting the domestic firms in question to more, not
less, competition while putting the same firms at a competitive disad-
vantage in the capital marketplace. 16 The winners in such a competi-
tion would be the firms not hampered by this artificial impediment-
the overseas firms. The result would be the loss of physical as well as
financial control over these critical defense industries.
In support of this proposition, this Note will first examine the leg-
islative history and executive enforcement of the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment, followed by a discussion of the goals of Exon-Florio and the
applicability of Exon-Florio to dual-use technologies. Then, after an
examination of the attitudes and experience of the European Commu-
nity with regards to such protectionism, specifically in France and the
United Kingdom, 17 this Note will argue that vigorous enforcement of
vous and will not take or knowingly administer any harmful drug." Id. at 54. The modern Code
of Professional Ethics has no such prohibition. Id. at 501-02. President Bush has embraced a
similar ideal, telling the National League of Cities in March 1992 that the "government's first
duty is like that of the physician: Do no harm." Ronald Brownstein, After The Riots: The Search
for Answers; Bush, Clinton Plan Different Curesfor Urban Ills, L.A. TIMeS, May 9, 1992, at Al.
16. This would occur, either by increasing the cost of capital, or by potentially eliminating
the availability of capital altogether. Individual firms, as "buyers" in the capital market, have
little market power. They take capital at the prevailing price, which is the interest rate (adjusted
appropriately for risk). If a firm is unable to find a domestic supplier of capital at the going rate,
and is simultaneously excluded from "purchasing" capital from foreign sources, the firm may
have no choice but to "purchase" capital at a higher rate, or go without. Either choice will put
the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the product market by increasing its cost of goods sold,
either due to increased debt service payments, or due to inefficient production techniques which
the firm is unable to change without a capital infusion. See generally Benjamin M. Friedman,
Savings, Investment, and Government Deficits in the 1980s, in U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY (Bruce R. Scott & George C. Lodge eds., 1985); Report of the President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization
of the House Comm. on Banking and Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1985).
17. Dissenting from the proposed legislation on the grounds that it is not strong enough,
Representative Dennis E. Eckart cited Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea as
countries which control foreign investment on the grounds of national security. H.R. REP. No.
399(l), supra note 10, at 28.
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the Exon-Florio Amendment, and a fortiori passage of the Technology
Preservation Act, is likely to result in less, not more, domestic produc-
tion of dual-use technologies. As a matter of defense policy, the
United States would be better off by allowing foreign ownership of
dual-use industries and relying on its sovereign authority to national-
ize those industries in time of war to ensure production if the situation
so demands.
I. EXON-FLORIO: AN EXERCISE IN SPLIT GOVERNMENT
Students of political science often claim that the apparent lack of
direction in U.S. politics at the national level is the result of a chronic
split between Republican administrations and a Democratically con-
trolled House and Senate.18 The division between Congress' protec-
tionist sentiment in passing the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 and the Bush administration's lax enforcement of the
Exon-Florio Amendment to that act serves as an illustration of that
division.
A. Legislative History
The House Conference Report accompanying the Exon-Florio
Amendment states that Congress' intent was limited to protecting the
national security, and that discouraging foreign direct investment was
not on their agenda.
The Conferees in no way intend to impose barriers to foreign investment.
The Conferees intend for this section to affect only Inward Foreign In-
vestment, i.e., overseas investment flowing into the United States. This
section is not intended to authorize investigations on investments that
could not result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate com-
merce nor to have any effect on transactions which are outside the realm
of national security.19
However, lying just below the surface of these eminently reason-
able limitations were hints of Congress' true intent: a broad interpre-
tation of national security, closely linked with economic security.
The standard of review in this section is "national security" ..... The
term "national security" is to be interpreted broadly without limitation to
particular industries .... [Factors to be considered] include but are not
18. Thomas B. Edsall, Political Scientists Examine a U.S. Government 'Divided.' WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 1990, at A2; Paul Johnson, The Price of Split Government: Europe's Confidence in
U.S. Suffers Broad Decline, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1987, Metro Section, at 8. For a specific appli-
cation of the troubles of split government, see Loretta Hagopian Harrison, Who Decides? The
Struggle for Control Over the Federal Government's Spending Power, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
66 (1988).
19. OMNIBus TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R.
REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988).
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limited to domestic production needed for projected national defense re-
quirements; the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet
national defense requirements ... ; and the control of domestic indus-
tries... as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to
meet the requirements of national security.
20
Thus Congress left a gap in the limitations they placed on the pow-
ers given the president under Exon-Florio. Subsequent events show
that at least certain members of Congress were disappointed that the
administration did not take advantage of that gap.
21
To fully understand the congressional intent behind Exon-Florio,
one must view it in the context of the events occurring immediately
before the statute's enactment. 22 The Exon-Florio Amendment was
enacted in the wake of the proposed acquisition of Fairchild Semicon-
ductor Corporation, a U.S. defense contractor, 23 by Fujitsu, a Japa-
nese corporation.24 An analysis of the political climate surrounding
the Fairchild deal is useful to understand the current developments.
The furor that arose as the proposed Fairchild acquisition became
public was remarkable. 25 In fact, the deal never went through, even
though the U.S. government did nothing official to stop it.26 In exam-
ining the political backdrop behind the Exon-Florio Amendment, it is
instructive to note two things: first, while Fairchild was a U.S. corpo-
ration, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schlumberger, a French
corporation, and therefore not even domestically owned; 27 second,
Fujitsu was a Japanese corporation, and thus was not affiliated with a
20. Id. (Emphasis added).
21. Foreign Investment: Administration Urged to Look Into "Politicization'" of Exon-Florio,
120 Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) A-5 (June 21, 1990).
22. For an insightful discussion of the surrounding circumstances, see Thomas J. Soseman,
International Law - The Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National
Security or a Protectionist Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597 (1990).
23. For a detailed history of the Fairchild-Fujitsu deal that never was, see Donna K.H. Wal-
ters & William C. Rempel, Trade War Victim; A One-Time Winner Is Out Of Chips, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1987, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Trade War Victim]; Donna K. H. Walters & William C.
Rempel, The Fairchild Deal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, § 1, at 1.
24. It is no coincidence that a recent agreement between Taiwan Aerospace and McDonnell-
Douglas to build a wide body airliner is adding to recent momentum towards strengthening the
Exon-Florio amendment. McDonnell Douglas- Taiwan Deal Seen Reheating Debate on Technol-
ogy Transfer, Agence France Presse, Nov. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File.
25. Foreign Money, U.S. Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, § 6, at 63; Exon, Metzenbaum
Attack Fairchild-Fujitsu Deal, Defense and Antitrust Concerns Raised, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
71 (Jan. 21, 1987).
26. Fujitsu backed out after public opinion in the United States became so heated. David E.
Sanger, Japanese Purchase of Chipmaker Canceled After Objections in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1987, at Al. Fairchild was subsequently sold to National Semiconductor for $80 mil-
lion less than had been offered by Fujitsu. Trade War Victim, supra note 23.
27. Trade War Victim, supra note 23.
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country that posed any kind of military threat to the United States.28
Indeed, Japan is a country whose very constitution prohibits the mak-
ing of war.29 Moreover, at the time of the proposed deal, Fairchild
had very few Department of Defense (DOD) contracts left.30 The
combination of Fairchild's relative insignificance as a defense contrac-
tor and its prior status as foreign-owned demonstrates clearly that the
true intent of Congress in enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment can-
not have been solely the protection of national security, but rather in-
cluded trade protectionism.
In 1987, as Exon-Florio was making its way through Capitol Hill,
the White House lobbied strenuously for the deletion of language au-
thorizing the president to block transactions which threaten to impair
the national security or "essential commerce."' 3' The White House
prevailed on this point, and the phrase "essential commerce" was not
included in the final version of the bill.32 Thus, the bill as passed rep-
resents a compromise between Congressional protectionist sentiments
and the Reagan administration's free trade policies. 33 It is clear that
Exon-Florio, as Congress would have liked it, was not truly the na-
tional security measure that it purported to be.34 The danger becomes
clear as well: an administration politically driven toward protection-
ism, unlike the current one, whose political fortunes are better served
28. See Japan Will "Never Again" Become a Military Threat, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, BBCSWB file; Sam Jameson, No
Military Role for Japan Suits All; Diplomacy: Tokyo Explains That Its Constitution Rules Out
Contributing Combat Forces, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, at A22. But see Kaifu Vows To Build
Up Japan's Self-Defense Capabilities, Japan Econ. Newswire, Mar. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ALLWLD File; Keith Richburg, Japan's Power Sparks Fears: Neighbors Leery of
Its Military Potential, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 16, 1990, at A17.
Moreover, Japan would not necessarily have to pose a direct military threat to raise U.S.
national security concerns. Toshiba Machine, a subsidiary of the Japanese conglomerate
Toshiba, was charged with the 1987 sale of sensitive submarine propeller technology to the Sovi-
ets. David E. Sanger, A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to Russians, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1987,
at Al. The U.S. government has only recently ended a three year ban on the procurement of
Toshiba Machine products. Kevin Power, Feds Quietly End Ban on Buying Toshiba Products, 11
GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS 3, 55 (1992).
29. KENP6 [Constitution] art. IX (Japan).
30. Walters & Rempel, The Fairchild Deal, supra note 23, at 1.
3 1. Barry K. Robinson, Practical Comments on the Exon-Forio Provisions and Proposed Reg-
ulations, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (Corporate Law and Practice Handbook Series, 1990).
32. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 5. OMNIBUS TRADE AND
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19.
33. See generally Soseman, supra note 22. The debate over the Technology Preservation Act
is taking on a similar tone. The Bush Administration so far is opposing the bill, and may even
threaten a veto if the bill is passed. Special Report: Foreign Investment, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 92 (Jan. 8, 1992).
34. Contrary to language in the House Report to the effect that Congress "in no way in-
tend[ed] to impose barriers to foreign investment." OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS
ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19.
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by a commitment to free trade, 35 might use Exon-Florio to implement
the language that the Reagan White House successfully lobbied out of
the statute. Robert Gilpin's statement about the "national interest" is
equally true of "national security"-"[a]s for the concept of 'national
interest,' the national interest of a given nation-state is, of course, what
its political and economic elite determines it to be."136 The definition
of national security, like any policy choice, is determined by the polit-
ical and economic elite. If the elite chooses to define national security
as the protection of domestic industries, then that is the definition that
will stand, for better, or as this Note will argue, for worse.
B. Implementation of Exon-Florio
In enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment, Congress intentionally
left national security undefined. 37 In fact, they encouraged a broad
interpretation of the term.3 8 Responsibility for implementing Exon-
Florio is delegated to an inter-agency body known as the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). 39 The CFIUS is cur-
rently headed by Stephen J. Canner, Director of the Office of Interna-
35. George Bush, Statement Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.
Dep't of State Dispatch (Jan. 6, 1992).
I am today reaffirming the unequivocal and longstanding support of the United States for a
policy of free and open foreign direct investment among all nations.... The United States,
the world's largest source and recipient of direct investment, has a major interest in fostering
open investment climates. We are committed to our open investment policy in the United
States, and we are aggressively seeking to open markets abroad.
Id.
In support of this assertion, the accompanying press release cited a number of U.S. initiatives
in that regard, including the U.S. position on trade related investment measures in the Uruguay
Round, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,
16 Bilateral Investment Treaties between the United States and various third world countries,
U.S. support for OECD study of multilateral investment guarantees, and the U.S. position in its
Structural Impediments Initiative talks with Japan. Id. See also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 261-62 (1991); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 123-26 (1990). For a state-
ment of the previous administration's policy on foreign investment, see Ronald Reagan, State-
ment by the President on International Investment, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch (Sept. 9, 1983).
36. ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATION 39 (1975).
37. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 19. It is precisely this lack of definition that causes the European Community's concern
with the Exon-Florio Amendment. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated with Exon-Forio,
supra note 12.
38. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 19. The final Treasury Department regulations remained true to the legislative intent in this
regard. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,774-75 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800); Final Exon-
Florio Rules To Give Guidance, Not Definitions, Treasury Official Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1230 (Aug. 8, 1990).
39. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618-24 (1988). The CFIUS was originally established
by President Ford in May 1975 to monitor foreign investment in the United States. Exec. Order
No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990-92 (1971-75 comp.), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
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tional Investment, Department of the Treasury. 40 Other agencies
represented include the Departments of State, Commerce, and De-
fense, as well as the Council of Economic Advisors, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, and the U.S. Trade Representative.
4'
The implementation of Exon-Florio thus far has been truer to the
White House's free trade policies than to Congress' protectionist in-
tent.42 This perceived lack of enforcement has not been ignored by
Congress. Indeed, Congress has attempted to remedy the situation
both by proposing strengthening legislation, 43 and by attempting to
pressure members of the CFIUS into stricter enforcement. 44 Argu-
ments have been made that the membership, and particularly the
chairmanship, of the CFIUS is the reason for its restrained implemen-
tation of Exon-Florio. Proponents of the Technology Preservation
Act claim that the fact that the Department of the Treasury occupies
the chair of the CFIUS creates a conflict of interest, due to the Treas-
ury's responsibility to manage the debt of the U.S. government. 45 The
Departments of Commerce and Defense have no such conflict of inter-
est. As a result, the Technology Preservation Act seeks to place pri-
mary responsibility for the implementation of Exon-Florio with these
two departments.
46
The CFIUS recently issued final regulations with regard to its im-
plementation of Exon-Florio.47 The regulations rely on a voluntary
filing system, and compliance is anticipated because of the open-ended
40. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 325 (Feb. 19, 1992).
41. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975) reprinted as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b (1988). Representatives from these agencies may not be below the rank of Assistant Secre-
tary. Id.
42. Exon-Florio Said To Be Inadequate, More Stringent Controls Needed, Int'l Bus. Daily
(BNA) (May 14, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
43. See discussion of the Technology Protection Amendment in Introduction, supra.
44. Foreign Investment: Administration Urged to Look into "Politicization" of Exon-Florio,
supra note 21.
45. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, supra note
40.
46. The Technology Preservation Act would change membership in the CFIUS to the Secre-
taries of Commerce, Defense, Treasury, Energy, and State, the National Security Advisor, the
U.S. Trade Representative, the Attorney General, and the Assistant to the president for Science
and Technology, as well as any other temporary designees the president may appoint. H.R.
2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Secretary of Commerce would be the chairman. Id.
47. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,774 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800). These regulations are
similar in most respects to the original draft regulations, released in 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989).
One provision changed is the formerly unlimited period during which the president could order
divestiture. Under the final regulations, the president has unlimited authority to order divesti-
ture based on circumstances contemporaneous with the transaction, but the CFIUS is limited to
a three year period during which to initiate a review. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,784 (1991) (to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(c)).
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nature of the CFIUS' authority.48 The regulations include a provision
which allows the president to retroactively order the undoing of any
transaction of which the CFIUS was not notified that threatens to im-
pair the national security.49 By implication, there is a "safe harbor"
for all transactions of which it was notified and that it approved.50
Prudent corporate attorneys consider an Exon-Florio filing to be a
necessary inconvenience for any transaction which could have any se-
curity implications."' The only reasons not to file with the CFIUS are
the time and cost involved, both of which appear to be minimal.
5 2
To date, there have been 677 voluntary filings with the CFIUS,
only fifteen of which have resulted in complete investigations 3 and
only one of which has seen presidential action.54 President Bush in-
voked Exon-Florio to force the divestiture of an aircraft parts manu-
facturer by a purchasing agent of the People's Republic of China.55
This inaction by the CFIUS is mostly due to the Reagan and Bush
administrations' commitment to free trade policies.5 6 Thus, while it is
unlikely that transactions will be significantly affected by Exon-Florio
under the current administration, precedent exists not only to block
such transactions but to force the divestiture of an enterprise once ac-
quired. There is no guarantee that future administrations will exercise
48. Exon-Florio gives firms the incentive to file voluntarily with the CFIUS by virtue of a
"safe harbor" status for those firms who have filed and have been found not to constitute a risk.
56 Fed. Reg. 58,787 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(b)(1)).
49. Id.
50. Most transactions which initiate an in-depth CFIUS review are restructured via negotia-
tions with the CFIUS so that they satisfy any national security concerns which may exist. Con-
gress Clears Legislation To Make Exon-Florio Permanent, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1127 (Aug.
7, 1991).
51. Joseph F. Denin, Getting a Transaction Past CFIUS: A Businessman's Guide To Exon-
Florio, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 375 (Mar. 22, 1989).
52. Another, more speculative, reason could be that a firm was trying to "get away" with a
transaction that it believes would be prohibited. While this possibility cannot be summarily dis-
missed, one might believe that if a foreign country were determined enough to attempt such a
maneuver, then protection against such an operation is more appropriately left to the intelligence
community than to the CFIUS, which is less institutionally competent in such matters.
53. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Forio Reviews, Lawyers Told, supra note
40.
54. For an exhaustive discussion of CFIUS activities through 1990, see Joseph E. Reece,
Buyer Beware: The United States No Longer Wants Foreign Capital to Fund Corporate Acquisi-
tions, 18 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279 (1990).
55. The Chinese company, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corpora-
tion (CATIC), was ordered to divest MAMCO Manufacturing, a Seattle-based aircraft compo-
nent manufacturer, in February of 1990. See Order Pursuant to § 721 of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 2, 1990; Jim Men-
denhall, Executive Authority To Divest Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio Amendment-The
MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 286 (1991). It took MAMCO until April 1991 to find
another investor willing to provide the needed capital. U.S. Buyer Found For Aircraft Parts Firm
Ordered Divested After Exon-Forio Review, Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA) (April 8, 1991).
56. See supra note 35.
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the same restraint, 57 especially considering that findings of the presi-
dent under Exon-Florio are not subject to judicial review.58
II. ENSURING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
A. The Goals of Exon-Florio
One of the goals of the Exon-Florio Amendment was maintaining
a domestic base of critical defense industries. 59 Though unstated, the
emphasis was clearly on domestic production of high technology mili-
tary goods.60 This is consistent with historical ideas regarding the ne-
cessity of maintaining control over the industrial backbone of the war
machine6' and is particularly significant given the recent triumph of
U.S. military technology over Iraq62 and the credit given to the U.S.
military in winning the Cold War.63 The threat is that allowing for-
eign corporations to control the manufacturers of military goods is
likely to put the availability of these goods at risk during wartime.64
The other goal articulated most frequently by supporters of the
amendment was to prevent sensitive military technology from falling
into the hands of our enemies. Exon-Florio is not the sole, nor even
57. This is the main concern of the European Community with regard to the Exon-Florio
Amendment. David Tirr, a senior EC official, recently commented that "the U.S. administration
has so far used the provision in a responsible way... [but] there is nothing in the law to prevent
a future administration from using the provisions extensively." EC Complains of Uncertainty
Associated with Exon-Florio, supra note 12. See Reece, supra note 54; Susan W. Liebeler, Yet
Another Reason Not to Invest in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 1989, at A10.
58. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988). For a detailed discussion of this aspect of the Exon-
Florio Amendment, see Patrick J. DeSouza, Executive Discretion to Regulate Foreign Investment
in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL'Y. 289 (1991).
59. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 19.
60. Twenty-nine representatives wrote a letter to President Bush urging action in one of the
first transactions to come under Exon-Florio review. They said, "[a]t a time when the U.S. is
lagging severely behind its competitors in its ability to produce computer chips, the virtual sell-
off of the wafer industry will help seal the fate of our weakening high-technology infrastructure."
Bush Clears Sale of Monsanto Wafer Unit To West German Firm Despite Congressional Opposi-
tion, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 182 (Feb. 8, 1989).
61. For a historical discussion of U.S. mobilization efforts, see RODERICK L. VAWTER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION (1983). For a discussion of the importance of control over the war-
time economy in Europe during the First and Second World Wars, see J.M. ROBERTS, EUROPE
1880-1945 284-87, 555-58 (2d ed. 1989).
62. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, High-Tech Weapons Earning Rave Reviews in Wartime Debuts,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1991, at A22. But see John Kenneth Galbraith, Fighting the Last War.
The Wonders of Modern Technology Were Above; Victory Was On The Ground, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
10, 1991, at MI.
63. Presidential Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 170 (Feb. 3, 1992).
64. CHARLES J. HITCH & ROLAND N. MCKEAN, THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE 243-44 (1975); CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, DETER-
RENCE IN DECAY: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 38 (1989).
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the primary, bulwark against such technology transfer.65 Other statu-
tory provisions include the Export Administration Act, 66 DOD Indus-
trial Security Regulations, 67  and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.68 Exon-Florio, however, is the furthest reach-
ing of these, and thus has the largest potential for abuse. 69
There are those who argue that national security broadly defined
should include not only military, but also economic security.70 While
some measure of economic security is essential to national security,
when Members of Congress speak of economic security in the Exon-
Florio context, they actually are talking about trade protectionism.
Their interpretation of national security must fail. First, as a matter of
linguistic integrity, "national security" has historically meant physical
security defended by military measures.7t If Congress had intended to
protect something other than "national security" as such, it should
65. For an exhaustive discussion of other statutory remedies, see Cecilia M. Waldeck, Pro-
posals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1175, 1190-1209 (1991).
66. The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988) (controlling the
export of certain sensitive technologies to countries which are deemed to pose a national security
threat). For a discussion of the effect this act has upon U.S. business, see Robert Kuttner, How
"National Security" Hurts National Competitiveness, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 140.
67. Department of Defense, Industrial Security Regulation, 5520.22-R (1985) (controlling
the handling of classified material by all individuals, U.S. national or foreign). See also Mark L.
Hanson, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States Defense Industry, 9
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 658, 666-68 (1989).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988) (requiring the President to declare a national emergency before
invoking it to block a foreign acquisition). This requirement severely complicates the interna-
tional political ramifications of the Act's use when, as in the Fairchild Semiconductor case, the
acquiring company is a U.S. ally. See generally, Note, The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1102, 1104 (1983).
69. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act is limited in that it requires the
President to declare a national emergency. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-76 (1988). The Department of
Defense regulations only apply to defense contractors acting as such, and thus would not apply
to manufacturers of civilian technology such as micro-computers. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL, 5220.22-M, at 1 (1985). The Export Administration Act is
the most general of these provisions, as it applies directly to a specified list of sensitive civilian
technologies. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1988).
70. Both the original House and Senate amendments contained the term "essential com-
merce" as one of the criteria for initiating review. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS
ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 924-25. See also Jonathan P. Hicks, The
Takeover of American Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, § 3, at 1; Samuel Fromartz, Law on
Foreign Buyouts Assailed as a Potential Trade Weapon, Reuter Bus. Rep., Dec. 12, 1989, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File. Most recently Jonathan J. Cowan, legislative
assistant to Representative Mel Levine (D-CA) said that Levine would like to see the Technology
Preservation Act expanded to include U.S. economic security. Narrow Interpretation of Statute
Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, supra note 40.
71. For an excellent discussion moving toward a definition of "national security" in this
context, see David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation ofImports and Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 947-49
(1990).
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have addressed the question directly. Second, even if one were to con-
cede that economic security were an appropriate goal of the Exon-
Florio Amendment, vigorous enforcement of the amendment would be
inimical to such economic security. In fact, the development of the
United States as an economic power has occurred to a large extent
because of, not in spite of, its openness to foreign investment.72 Mile-
stones in the course of U.S. history financed by foreign capital include
the Erie Canal and the Louisiana Purchase.
73
Direct foreign investment holds many benefits for the United
States. 74 To begin with, direct foreign investment creates jobs. Here,
it is critical to differentiate between direct investment and its counter-
part, portfolio investment. Direct investment is defined as investment
that results in a foreign "person" controlling a domestic enterprise. 75
This includes both so-called "greenfield investments" 76 and invest-
ment in existing concerns. The job creation function of "greenfield
investment" is obvious: a foreigner builds a new facility in the host
country and staffs it with domestic labor, resulting in new jobs. The
Technology Preservation Act specifically exempts "greenfield" invest-
ments from its purview.
77
The job creation function of direct investment in existing enter-
prises is less clear. This function is better described as "preventing job
loss" than "job creation." One major requirement of a firm's contin-
ued existence is its ability to attract capital investment at a reasonable
72. See generally Reece, supra note 54, at 279, nn.20-26 (1990). For a discussion of the
openness of U.S. foreign investment policy, see GORDON & LEES, supra note 13, at 21-25 (1986).
73. David Boorstin, Foreign Investments in America, 2 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 563, 571
(1974). See also Douglass C. North, International Capital Flows and the Development of the
American West, 16 J. ECON. HIsT. 493 (1956).
74. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1991), supra note 35, at 258-61; EDWARD
M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1989); Jeffrey M. Schaefer & David G. Strongin, Why All the Fuss About Foreign Investment?,
32 CHALLENGE 31 (1989).
75. This definition is refined in the International Investment and Trade in Service Survey
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10) (1988), as "ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one person
of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an incorporated business enterprise or an
equivalent interest in an unincorporated business enterprise." Id.
76. These investments are known as "greenfield" investments because the design of modem
manufacturing plants often requires a vast expanse of land in order to accommodate in-line pro-
duction facilities. Such vast expanses of land are often only available in rural areas, areas cur-
rently covered by "green fields." However, General Motors Corporation used a "greenfield"
plant design for its Detroit, Michigan "Poletown" plant, much to the chagrin of the residents
whose homes were converted into a "field" for that purpose. James Kelly, The Last Days of
Poletown; A Neighborhood Faces Doom and a New Auto Plant May Rise, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at
29; William Serrin, Detroit, G.M. and Court Act to Doom Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1981, § 1, at 24.
77. Technology Preservation Act of 1991, supra note 10; H.R. REP. No. 399(I), supra note
10. See also 56 Fed. Reg. 58,774 (1991) (To be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.301(b)(4), example 3
(exempting greenfield investments from the scope of Exon-Florio)).
1014 [Vol. 13:1002
Summer 1992] Exon-Florio Amendment 1015
price. 78 If a firm is denied access to capital, it will not be able to invest
in improving plants and equipment, will fall behind in its productive
capacity, and will likely be overtaken in the competitive marketplace
in the long run. Alternatively, if the supply of capital is restricted, the
firm's cost of capital will be significantly raised, 79 and it will have to
invest at a significantly increased cost with a similar result.8 0 Given
the international nature of the capital market,8 ' categorizing capital as
"foreign" or "domestic" is futile, because for all practical purposes all
capital is international.8 2 Restricting the flow of international capital
to domestic firms will hamper those firms in the competitive market-
place and induce predictably negative results. Therefore, saying that
direct foreign' investment in existing enterprises saves jobs merely
states the corollary of the more straightforward idea that preventing
access to international capital will lose jobs.
83
Direct foreign investment can also improve the host country's bal-
ance of payments.84 Contrary to popular belief, under a floating ex-
change rate regime a country's balance of payments is always exactly
78. BRUCE R. SCOTl & GEORGE C. LODGE, U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1985).
Since World War II, the shift of industrial activity toward science based activities... means
that national competitiveness depends increasingly on technology, capital investment, and
labor skills .... [U]nlike natural resources, these manmade resources move readily across
national boundaries.
Id. at 5.
79. An increase in the firm's cost of capital would occur as a result of conventional market
forces. Cutting a firm off from foreign sources of capital will have the effect of shifting the
relevant supply (of capital) curve upward. The firm will therefore be forced to pay more for
capital than comparably situated firms, all other things being equal. See generally Robert M.
Giordano, Foreign Financing of the Federal Budget Deficit Myths and Realities, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: NEW DIRECTIONS 115 (Surendra K. Kaushik ed., 1989) (discuss-
ing this effect with regards to the economy as a whole).
80. Under conventional economic analysis, assuming that the capital market is such that
capital will be available to any firm, at a price, an increased cost of capital would be the more
likely result. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (11 th ed. 1980). For example, in
the Fujitsu-Fairchild case, another source of capital was found for $80 million less than Fujitsu's
offer. Walters & Rempel, Trade War Victim, supra note 23. However, in the MAMCO divesti-
ture, over a year went by before MAMCO was able to find another buyer. US. Buyer Found For
Aircraft Parts Firm Ordered Divested After Exon-Florio Review, supra note 55. Presumably, some
financially troubled firms could not have held out that long.
81. Sam Y. Cross, The Growth And Changing Character Of The Foreign Exchange Market, in
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: NEW DIRECTIONS 84, 93 (Surendra K. Kaushik ed.,
1989).
82. Id. In fact, one sixth of all U.S. capital investment in recent years has come from foreign
sources. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1990), supra note 35, at 123.
83. But see GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 74, at 48. (arguing that employment is deter-
mined by supply of rather than demand for labor, and therefore foreign direct investment (FDI)
has no net effect on U.S. employment. The authors claim that, assuming the U.S. economy is at
or near the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), the Federal Reserve
Board would be obliged to offset any gains from FDI by tightening monetary policy to cool
inflationary pressures).
84. For an economic discussion of this mechanism, see Richard H. Clarida, That Trade Defi-
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that-in balance. Just as a floating price clears the market for wheat,
a floating exchange rate clears the market for currency.85 A country's
international monetary flows are, however, broken down into seg-
ments, called accounts. When (primarily U.S.) politicians speak of the
balance of payments, they are referring to what economists call the
"current account," or "goods and services." Any imbalance in this
account must be offset by an equivalent imbalance in the "capital ac-
count."' 86 The net result of this equation is that for all the dollars the
United States sends abroad in exchange for imported goods, the coun-
tries of the world send an equivalent amount back in the form of for-
eign investment.8 7 To put it more succinctly, the United States gains
the benefits of both inexpensive imports and investment dollars. The
reality of the so-called trade deficit is much less pernicious than is
commonly perceived.
Moreover, direct foreign investment spurs domestic competition.
As foreign firms establish facilities in the host country, it is often in
industries where there is currently little domestic competition. Thus,
the current domestic monopoly or oligopoly is obliged to compete
with the foreign firm, to the monopolist's detriment, but to society's
advantage.
8 8
Finally, direct foreign investment can spur domestic investment by
lowering interest rates. 89 Domestic investment funds are traded in a
market similar to any other commodity. The price is the prevailing
interest rate. As foreign investment increases the supply of investment
funds, the price of these funds drops. As the interest rate drops, firms
become more likely to invest.9° And investment is the key sector of
the economy for future economic growth, as well as job creation. 91
cit, Protectionism and Policy Coordination, 12 WORLD ECON. 415, 419 (1989); GRAHAM &
KRUGMAN, supra note 74, at 49-51 (1989).
85. SAMUELSON, supra note 80, at 609-611.
86. However, when examined empirically these two accounts never match exactly. Thus,
there exists a third account, "net errors and omissions," designed to balance the two. For de-
tailed country-by-country statistics on balance of payments flows, see International Monetary
Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics (published monthly).
87. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1990), supra note 35, at 127.
88. WILLIAM J. ADAMS, RESTRUCTURING THE FRENCH ECONOMY 185-95 (1989).
89. Robert M. Giordano, supra note 79.
This inflow of foreign capital that has augmented domestic savings allowed the large budget
deficits to co-exist with trendline real economic growth and substantially lower interest
rates-a combination that probably would have been impossible if the U.S. economy were
closed and such capital inflows did not exist.
Id. at 123.
90. See SAMUELSON, supra note 80, at 557-58; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 35, at 129.
91. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
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Direct foreign investment not only creates its own jobs, but increases
the likelihood of domestic investors creating jobs.
For all the benefits of direct investment, 92 its survival in the polit-
ical arena is far from assured.
Economic theory argues convincingly that free trade leads to the most
efficient allocation of resources and maximises a country's economic wel-
fare. Empirical research also shows that unilateral and bilateral tariff
reductions yield significant welfare gains [and by analogy, so does an
open foreign investment policy]. Reality, however, teaches us that tariffs
(and other trade restrictions) are prevalent in all periods and countries,
and that there is a continual danger of ever-increasing protectionism in
the world.
93
Features of the the United States that attract foreign investors in-
clude the size of the U.S. market and the political stability of the
United States. 94 Foreign direct investment in the United States is
likely to continue to the extent that U.S. policies do not discourage
such investment. The U.S. government must avoid such protectionism
as the Exon-Florio Amendment permits, because the lost investment
would far outweigh any political gains.95
B. Applying Exon-Florio to Dual-Use Technologies: The Futility
The ostensible purpose of Exon-Florio was to ensure an industrial
base of critical defense industries.96 However, Exon-Florio is clearly
ineffective in achieving this goal for dual-use industries. In order to
STATES (1991). "Foreign investment creates jobs in the short term, but its lasting impact on the
U.S. economy is through new investment and productivity growth." Id. at 16.
92. One further measure of the benefit to the U.S. economy of foreign investment is the
lengths to which a local government will go to attract such foreign investment. See Andrew P.
Laszlo, Note, A Survey of Techniques Employed by State and Local Governments for the Promo-
tion of Foreign Direct Investment, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 155 (1984); see also
RICHARD B. MCKENZIE & DWIGHT R. LEE, QUICKSILVER CAPITAL: How THE RAPID MOVE-
MENT OF WEALTH HAS CHANGED THE WORLD (1991) (discussing the competitive atmosphere
facing local and national governments).
93. Bruno Frey, The Political Economy of Protection, in CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 39 (David Greenaway ed. 1985). Frey proposes an economic model to explain
why protectionism is politically attractive notwithstanding the evidence that it results in a net
welfare loss for the protected country. For a detailed economic discussion of the welfare costs of
protectionism, see OECD, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROTECTION (1985).
94. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 74, at 27-44; GORDON & LEES, FOREIGN MULTI-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 13, at 67; Schaeffer & Strongin,
supra note 74, at 157.
95. See Kenneth T. Walsh et al., The "America First Fallacies, "U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 22; Stephen Chapman, Attacking Japan Won't Help the U.S. Economy, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 5, 1992, at C3.
96. One criticism of the CFIUS' handling of this task comes from a GAO report claiming
that rather than examining acquisitions on a case by case basis, the CFIUS should do analysis by
industry sectors to determine if acquisitions within that sector constitute a security threat. GAO,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 24-26 (Mar. 1990)
(GAO/NSIAD-90-94).
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see the futility of Exon-Florio with regard to dual-use technologies,
however, one must first examine Exon-Florio's applicability to tradi-
tional defense industries.
What are the critical defense industries, and how have they
changed over time?97 Traditionally, the industries most important to
the defense establishment were heavy industries-steel, coal, and mass
production factories capable of producing large quantities of tanks,
rifles, and other relatively unsophisticated tools of war.98 In fact,
World War II was, in part, fought over control of such critical defense
industries in the Ruhr Valley and Lorraine regions on the border be-
tween France and Germany. 99 The U.S. military-industrial complex
was formed primarily during World War II and consisted of the same
kind of heavy industry that existed in the disputed Ruhr Valley and
Lorraine regions. Thus, when examined under the old model of na-
tional security, the intent of the Exon-Florio amendment seems pru-
dent: national military might is predicated on the availability of the
tools of war,100 and therefore Congress is justified in enacting legisla-
tion to prbtect the supply of these war materials.
In the modem context, however, this concept of national security
is not so easily defended. The tools of war have changed from the
blunt instruments used in World Wars I and II to the surgical instru-
ments displayed in the Gulf War.' 10 The essential materials have
changed from iron and steel to titanium and silicon wafer chips.
0 2
While the U.S. defense industry has never had the ability to respond
97. For a detailed discussion of the history of the U.S. defense industrial base, see Jacques S.
Gansler, The Diminishing Economic and Strategic Viability of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, American University). For a current view, see JOHN N. ELLI-
SON ET AL., MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY (1988). See also THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION &
USNI MILITARY DATABASE, LIFELINE IN DANGER: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITES STATES
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE (1988).
98. Also of critical importance have been the raw materials to feed those industries. For a
thoughtful analysis and historical survey, see RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ, WHEN NATIONS CLASH:
RAW MATERIALS, IDEOLOGY, AND FOREIGN POLICY (1989).
99. See J.M. ROBERTS, EUROPE 1880-1945, 352-53 (2d ed. 1989); GuY GREER, THE RUHR-
LORRAINE INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE
Two REGIONS AND THEIR RELATION To THE REPARATION QUESTION (1925).
100. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 10-11, 40-57 (J.J. Graham trans., 1956). Or, as
former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Robert Costello said, "You can't fight a war
with pizza parlors." CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra note 64, at 3.
101. See Gugliotta, supra note 62, at A22.
102. In response to the advent of the semi-conductor as a critical defense technology, the
U.S. government established SEMATECH, a consortium of high technology firms to ensure
availability of these critical components. Evelyn Richards, Consortia & Competitiveness. Reviews
Mixed, With Sematech Up For Renewal, Ventures' Success is Debated, WASH. POST, Dec. 15,
1991, at HI. However, not all agree Sematech has lived up to its lofty aspirations. Id. See also
THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI MILITARY DATABASE, supra note 97, at 57-59.
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immediately to emergency defense requirements, 0 3 it now requires
two or even three full years to produce one of the basic tools of the
U.S. Armed Forces-the F- 16 jet fighter. t04
Maintaining a viable U.S. defense industry in the modem era is at
once both less and more important than ever. A viable domestic de-
fense industry is less important, because military conflicts no longer
provide enough lead time to engage in any pre-conflict production, 10 5
and therefore it is current stock, not current production capacity, that
is important to military success. At the same time, the U.S. defense
industry is more important, because the military hardware now more
than ever is outcome-determinative. 0 6 When the outcome of a mili-
tary conflict depends on the quality and immediate availability of mili-
tary hardware, gambling on the goodwill of foreign suppliers is risky
indeed.' 0 7 Moreover, when the United States depends on foreign sup-
pliers for military technology, that same technology will necessarily be
available to other purchasers. If the United States is to maintain its
worldwide military superiority, it must maintain its military machine,
103. See TIMOTHY D. GILL, INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS: BREAKING WITH AN ERRATIC
PATH (1984).
Major U.S. military conflicts of the 20th century have demonstrated the importance of in-
dustrial strength to national security. Yet a strong propensity persists in the United States
to neglect industrial preparedness in times of peace. The results of this neglect have been
costly. Far more national resources have been expended during the hurry-up and catch-up
times of war than would have been expended by maintaining a higher level of readiness over
the long haul. Bernard Baruch estimated the three mobilizations in which he had been
involved (World Wars One and Two and Korea) cost in excess of $160 billion more than
was necessary. How many times must we learn?
Id. at 57.
104. Melinda Beck et al., Can U.S. Industry Deliver?, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1981, at 40.
On the eve of one of the biggest defense buildups in peacetime history, there is serious doubt
that the nation's defense industry can deliver the goods on time and within budget. After
years of dampened military spending, the U.S. defense industry has dwindled substan-
tially .... There are scattered shortages of men and material and many firms have cut
capacity .... An F-16 fighter that took 120 weeks to build in 1977 now takes 180 weeks.
Delays mean higher price tags; and if the huge cost overruns in the Trident program are any
example, the Pentagon's shopping list could easily bust even a swelled defense budget-and
with it the Reagan Administration's hopes of eliminating the Federal deficit.
Id.
105. Gansler, supra note 97, at 1.
It is a basic strategic tenet that the U.S. defense industry must be self sufficient .... [li]t is
assumed that the U.S. defense industry, through the excess capacity it maintains, has the
ability to respond rapidly and at high rates of production whenever the military demand so
requires. However, this response time has always been unacceptably long, and it is becom-
ing longer because of inadequate planning and preparation and the increased complexity of
military equipment.
Id.
106. See Gugliotta, supra note 62, at A22.
107. This is the contention of the proponents of Exon-Florio. However, there are two critical
distinctions between foreign-based suppliers and foreign-owned suppliers. First, as this Note will
discuss infra, domestically based suppliers can be nationalized in times of war. Second, domesti-
cally based suppliers are not subject to interruption of shipping channels (the U-boat problem).
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including its domestic defense industrial complex, in working order. 0 8
This is one of the goals of the Exon-Florio Amendment.
Should this goal apply to products used both in the military sector
and in the civilian sector? Examples of dual-use products range from
such common everyday items as milk, bread, fuel, and clothing to
more sophisticated products like microcomputers and the silicon chips
that drive most of our modem weapon systems. 09 Our national de-
fense relies no less on food and clothing for our troops than on the
sophisticated weapons of war, but the difficulties surrounding the
availability of dual-use products are particularly significant with high
technology products. The ubiquitous presence of dual-use technolo-
gies in the civilian market will alter the intended results of any policy
the government implements regarding the supply of such products,
whether or not policy makers recognize that impact.
With the Cold War's end and the diffusion of technical prowess among
America's ostensible allies, national security has a more complex mean-
ing, and the United States needs to come to terms with the contradictory
role played in the commercial economy by the Pentagon. In a changing
political and economic world, traditional policies are no longer tenable.
They provide neither military nor economic security. In fact, they may
undermine both. " 10
In the end, the analysis of how best to meet our defense needs must
conform to the realities of the marketplace."I ' Protectionist policies
like Exon-Florio interfere with the marketplace in such a way as to
impede and possibly extinguish the very industries which they purport
to protect.
In addition to maintaining U.S. defensive industrial capacity, an-
other goal of Exon-Florio is to prevent the export of U.S. military
108. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra note 64, at 9.
109. Kuttner, supra note 66, at 340.
A 1989 "Critical Technologies Plan" published by the Department of Defense identified 22
technologies essential to future military security, but the technologies are also indicators of
commercial strength. On the list: microelectronic circuits and their fabrications, gallium
arsenide and other semiconductor compounds, software, parallel computer architectures,
machine intelligence and robotics, computer simulation and modeling, integrated optics,
and fiber optics.
Id. at 340.
110. Id. at 343-44.
111. As an example, see id. at 340.
So while the U.S. military incubated the [supercomputer] industry and depends on the sur-
vival of companies like Cray and Control Data, these companies are in no way captive
contractors to government. Three-quarters of their sales are to nongovernment customers,
and they are in the thick of global competition. Cray, for example, is a relatively small
company, with some 5,000 employees and sales of about $750 million. Its three main Japa-
nese competitors are Hitachi (sales, $50 billion), NEC (sales, $32 billion), and Fujitsu (sales,
$18 billion)-each among the world's 50 largest industrial corporations.
Id. at 350-55.
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technology. However, recent events in the former Soviet Union, re-
sulting in the dissolution of our primary technologically advanced mil-
itary rival, have arguably lessened the necessity of preventing such
technology transfer.11 2 Moreover, other regimes exist to accomplish
this end. 1 3 Still, preventing technology transfer is one of the stated
legislative goals of the Exon-Florio Amendment, and the statute is at
least rationally related to the accomplishment of that goal." 1
4
Preventing the outflow of sensitive technology is a difficult task.
Exon-Florio seeks to accomplish the task by keeping control over such
technology in the hands of U.S. corporations, whose national loyalties
would presumably outweigh the profit motive that might induce for-
eign nationals to leak sensitive military technology to nations posing a
military threat to the United States.' 1 5 Whether this approach is gen-
erally wise, it has no bearing on the application of Exon-Florio to
dual-use technologies.
Dual-use technologies, by their nature, are present in the public
domain. While their inventors may patent them," t6 and the govern-
ment may place export controls upon them,' 1 7 there will be numerous
physical examples of the technology available to any foreign operatives
to spirit out of this country and take back home to "reverse engi-
neer.""1 " Admittedly, certain production technologies are not in the
112. See Stuart Auerbach, US. Drafting Plan to Relax Technology Export Curbs, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1989, at Fl.
113. See discussion, supra notes 65-69.
114. The traditional standard of review for determining the constitutionality of statutes like
Exon-Florio would be the "rational relation" test. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
303 (2d ed. 1988). However, the Court traditionally gives much more deference to issues which
impact national security. See. e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). See also TRIBE, at 353-55. For a detailed discussion, see Patrick J. DeSouza,
Executive Discretion to Regulate Foreign Investment in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL'Y. 289
(1991).
115. For a contrary view, consider the number of U.S. military personnel transferring sensi-
tive information to the Soviets. William Scott Malone & William Cran, Code Name Catastrophe:
How Moscow Cracked our Secret Cipher Systems, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1989, at D1.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). But see 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1988) (allowing the government to
classify an investment as secret on the grounds of national security).
117. Export Control Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1988). Export controls, however, consti-
tute a major structural impediment to the competitiveness of U.S. industry.
The costs of this system are enormous. According to a 1987 blue-ribbon commission of the
National Academy of Sciences, the lost business resulting from the export control system
costs U.S. companies $9.3 billion a year. But the real price of export controls is certainly
much higher. Because of the export control system, the United States is losing vast trade
opportunities-in Eastern Europe and the developing world.
Kuttner, supra note 66, at 140.
118. "Reverse engineering" is the process of learning how to manufacture a product by a
close examination of a physical specimen of the product or a technical manual for the product.
The noted Walker spy ring, led by former Navy warrant officer John A. Walker, Jr., supplied the
Soviets with the materials to reverse engineer highly sensitive cryptographic equipment. Walker
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public domain, and it is much easier to use the blueprints than to re-
verse engineer a high technology item, but the point remains that if the
technology were that sensitive, it would not be in the hands of U.S.
consumers. Truly sensitive technology should and does remain in the
classified files of U.S. citizens with national security clearances.' 19 Do-
mestic control over producers of such technology would not effectively
prevent the transfer of most dual-use technology; the technology is
already widely available.
C. Applying Exon-Florio to Dual- Use Technologies: The Harm
If applying Exon-Florio to dual-use technologies were merely fu-
tile, there would be no cause for alarm. It would not be the first, nor
the greatest, waste of taxpayer money. 120  Strict enforcement of the
Exon-Florio Amendment would discourage foreign direct investment
in U.S. dual-use industries. This could in turn diminish the domestic
dual-use industrial base, and with it U.S. competitiveness and domes-
tic jobs. The domestic base of dual-use industries is most seriously
threatened not by foreign investors buying up U.S. manufacturers,1 21
but by foreign (and U.S.) investors opening competing concerns
overseas. 1
22
said: "Obviously you can't steal the equipment, so the next best thing would be to give them the
technical manual. From the technical manual, you can build the equipment by a process of
[reverse] engineering." Malone & Cran, supra note 115, at DI. Not only the Soviets engage in
reverse engineering, however. The U.S. Department of Defense is using it as a weapon against its
own contractors and high sole-source pricing. "Reverse Engineering" Effort May Save Pentagon
$400 Million, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1988, at C28. Reverse engineering is also used by private
industry, particularly in the area of computer chip technology. Business Technology: A New
Coating Thwarts Chip Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at D9.
119. For a discussion of industrial security clearances in the context of foreign-owned de-
fense contracting, see William B. Barton & Krista L. Peterson, Industrial Security Clearances:
Heightened Importance in a World of Corporate Acquisitions. Takeovers and Foreign Investment,
18 PuB. CONT. L.J. 392, 400-01 (1987).
120. See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan, Oversight Unseen: GAO Reports Gathering Dust; The General
Accounting Office Spends $435 Million a Year to Document Waste, Expose Fraud - and Be Ig-
nored, THE RECORDER, Mar. 6, 1992, at 2; Mark L. Goldstein, Chasing Wayward Billions,
GOV'T EXECUTIVE, May 1991; Dave Griffiths, How You Ended Up Paying $7,662 for a Coffee-
pot, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 1989, at 13.
121. Cf GILPIN, supra note 36, at 55. Gilpin's thesis is that foreign direct investment is good
for the receiving economy. Speaking, ironically enough, of the dependence of foreign countries
on U.S. direct investment, rather than U.S. dependence on foreign investment, he states "the
periphery [receiving country] is dependent precisely because it gains ... from integration with
the core [investing country]. The severing of ties with the core would involve an unacceptable
cost to the peripheral economy." Id. at 56.
122. One danger foreign competition presents to the U.S. defense base is the import of com-
peting materials, which may not be reliable sources of critical defense related material. This is
addressed.by § 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988), which allows
restricting imports of certain products if the imports may constitute a threat to U.S. national
security. For an exhaustive discussion of § 232, see Nance & Wasserman, supra note 71, at 927-
51.
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Dual-use technologies are not subject to the kind of market manip-
ulation that the DOD engages in with strictly military applications. 
123
The DOD can and does choose its suppliers based on national origin,
and thus can ensure a thriving market for those items of which it is the
major, or sole, purchaser.1 24 Dual-use technologies, on the other
hand, have no such guarantee. They have to compete in the wider
civilian market, and must remain competitive to survive. In order to
remain competitive a firm must attract capital investment.1 25 Without
access to capital, a firm is likely to be overrun in the marketplace.
This can happen in three ways: first, by not allowing the firm to re-
place and modernize obsolete plants and equipment;126 second, by
raising the firm's cost of capital, and thereby its overall cost structure;
and third, by disallowing the competitive advantages of affiliation with
a large multi-national enterprise, most notably the ability to weather a
significant economic downturn.1
27
123. Department of Defense, Industrial Security Regulation, Directive 5220.22-R (Jan.
1983). See Hanson, supra note 67, at 658.
124. Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § lOa-d, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title VII,
Aug. 23, 1988. (The Buy American Act was strengthened by part of the same Omnibus Trade
Act of 1988 as the Exon-Florio Amendment.) The Buy American Act orders the DOD to
purchase U.S.-made products, when available, even if the price is as much as fifty percent higher
than an imported substitute. Thus, the DOD can ensure a market for any products it purchases,
but only to the extent of its purchases. However, even that amount may not be enough given
certain dual-use industries. Cray, a well known manufacturer of supercomputers, sells only 25%
of its output to the government. One must question Cray's ability to survive if it lost the remain-
ing 75% of its business to overseas competitors. See Kuttner, supra note 66, at 140, 144-45.
125. Scott & Lodge, supra note 78, at 5.
One potential problem with the mere existence of the Exon-Florio Amendment is its potential
for abuse as a defensive weapon during hostile takeovers. This can also have a chilling effect on
capital investment. For a detailed discussion, see Soseman, supra note 22, at 597.
126. GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 18 (Mar.
1990) (GAO/NSIAD-90-94). A recent example illustrating this point appeared in the same
report.
This acquisition, involving a major U.S. supplier of certain semiconductor materials, under-
went... CFIUS review.... The U.S. firm was not a direct contractor to DOD, although it
was a subcontractor on unclassified work. Alternative foreign or domestic suppliers were
available, and there was no evidence the specific buyer would threaten national security.
The U.S. firm needed capital to redesign equipment to remain competitive and continue
research, and no other U.S. firms had shown interest in acquiring it. One CFIUS partici-
pant noted that, in his view, the case presented a choice between two undesirable alterna-
tives: (1) foreign ownership, which could mean that fundamental science and technology
would shift offshore; or (2) continued business difficulties for the U.S. firm, which would
prevent it from aggressively pursuing the next generation of processing equipment.
Id. at 25-26.
127. Id. at 18.
[M]any industry analysts maintain that segments of the semiconductor industry have been
"hollowed out" incrementally as a result not only of foreign acquisitions but also of U.S.
firms' difficulties in competing against foreign firms. These commercial competitive factors
include superior foreign technologies and product quality, but they also reflect differing U.S.
and foreign industry structures. For example, large vertically integrated Japanese conglom-
erates can better withstand the steep downturns in business cycles that are characteristic of
this industry, because profits earned from consumer product sales can sustain the firms'
other operations.
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The free flow of capital across national boundaries characterizes
the nature of modem world financial markets. 28 The effect of such
capital flow on a firm is twofold: first, it creates an enlarged capital
pool from which to draw capital for expansion and other financial
needs; second, it allows the firm's competitors to do the same. Firms
must compete with each other not only in the product market but in
the capital market as well.' 29 Vigorous enforcement of the Exon-
Florio Amendment would effectively eliminate all foreign investment
funds from the pool available to domestic producers of dual-use tech-
nology products, 3 0 and simultaneously force any foreign firms inter-
ested in entering the market for those products to enter as an overseas
producer. '3' Consequently, U.S. firms are simultaneously subjected to
more competition and hampered in their ability to compete.
Finally, current business and technological conditions call one of
the goals of the Exon-Florio Amendment into question: the threat of
technology transfer. In the current global market, the United States
does not necessarily rank first in technology or industrial practices. In
fact, the United States stands to benefit from inward technology trans-
fer, and perhaps even requires such technology transfer to ensure na-
tional security.
The unfortunate reality in the modem world is that the United States no
longer has a monopoly of technology and limiting our concerns in this
area to keeping the foreign companies from getting our secrets is inade-
quate. We have to get access to their leading edge technology that we
need to maximize the protection of the United States.' 32
Particularly in Japanese-U.S. joint ventures, the Japanese bring
much more high technology to the table than their U.S. counter-
parts. 13 The United States cannot afford to ignore the valuable tech-
nology currently resident in Japanese or other foreign multinational
corporations.
Id. at 18.
128. Cross, supra note 81, at 93.
129. In fact, competition for international capital investment is so great that even govern-
ments compete by creating pro-business policies to attract private investment. MCKENZIE &
LEE, supra note 92, at xi.
130. Reece, supra note 54, at 279.
131. Liebeler, supra note 57, at 1.
132. Hearings Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
46 (1990) (Testimony of C. Fred Bergstren, Director, Institute for International Economics and
former chairman of the CFIUS).





European attitudes towards foreign direct investment in defense
industries result in part from the particular country's wartime experi-
ence. They are also affected by participation in the European Commu-
nities. 134 Specifically, "[a] Council directive of June 24, 1988 lifts all
restrictions on capital movements ... creating what has been called a
'European Financial Area.' "135 This directive orders all EC Member
States to harmonize their foreign investment laws and to abolish any
legal restraints on foreign investment by other Member States.' 3 6 Fur-




France's military experience has led the French to realize the im-
portance of an independent defense establishment.' 38  In 1870, the
French lost the Alsace-Lorraine region, a major producer of iron ore,
to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War. Following World War I, the
Treaty of Versailles gave France control over the Alsace-Lorraine, as
well as the contiguous Ruhr Valley region of Germany, a major indus-
trial center. 139 Shortly thereafter, the Germans recaptured both re-
gions during World War II.140 These and France's other historical
troubles with physical control over the machinery of war have led to a
strong French belief in maintaining domestic defense capabilities.
This attitude is reflected in France's general policy toward foreign in-
vestment, '4' its industrial policy regarding domestic defense produc-
134. See generally Simon macLachlan & William Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Eu-
rope-Practicability, Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373, 381-83
(1989).
135. DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 3.02[1], p. 3-6 (referring to Directive 88/361 EEC of
June 24, 1988 Concerning the Implementation ofArticle 67 of EEC Treaty [1988] O.J. No. L 178/
5, July 8, 1988).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. ADAMS, supra note 88, at 47-48.
139. For a prescient discussion of the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, see JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 81-101 (1920).
140. ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, OC-
CUPIED EUROPE: GERMAN EXPLOITATION AND ITS POST-WAR CONSEQUENCES 28 (1944). See
generally EUGENE SCHAEFFER, L'ALSACE ET LA LORRAINE (1940-1945) LEUR OCCUPATION
EN DROIT ET EN FAIT (1953).
141. SIMEON & ASSOCIES, MOQUET BORDE & ASSOCIES, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE,
§ 1.04[1] (1992).
Foreign investments in France are subject to a significant amount of governmental interven-
tion. The purpose of such intervention is not to systematically prohibit or limit the amount
of foreign investment in France, but rather to control the nature and modalities thereof so as
to encourage those investments which are beneficial to the French economy.
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tion, 142 and in the French statutory framework. 143  For example,
France has nationalized the production of one major dual-use product:
computers. 144 Groupe Bull, France's nationalized computer com-
pany, is also Europe's largest computer manufacturer. 145 While both
NEC, a Japanese company, and IBM now own approximately five per-
cent each of Groupe Bull t46 (which in turn owns Zenith Data Sys-
tems, 147 until recently the major provider of microcomputers to the
DOD), Groupe Bull's rhetoric preceding the actual sale was stridently
nationalistic and did not welcome foreign investment. 48 However, it
is quite possible that without this continuing foreign investment,
Groupe Bull, along with the rest of Europe's computer manufacturers,
might go out of business. 149
B. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's experience with defense industrial produc-
tion has focused more on economic policy.'50 The United Kingdom
has transformed its defense industrial establishment into both a large
Id. at 1-16.
142. Jeffrey Bairstow, Europe's Computer Dinosaurs Will Become Extinct: European Com-
puter Makers Will Go Out Of Business Due To Increased Competition, ELECTRONIC Bus., May
20, 1991, at 112.
General de Gaulle had a grand vision of France as a nuclear power that required huge
investments in advanced technology and the maintenance of a national computer industry.
Is it important to French industrialists that France be a leader in nuclear weapons today? I
suggest that it's more important for French government and business to have ready access to
the latest in computer technology.
Id.
143. Responsibility for carrying out France's direct investment policy is given to the
Gouvernement, which issues decrees having the force of law. DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE,
§ 3.02[l][a], p. 3-7. Foreign investment in France is subject to, inter alia, a prior authorization
requirement, id. § 3.02[2)[b], at 3-13, as well as exchange control regulation, id. § 3.02[3], at 3-
24. Moreover, any individual, French citizen or not, must obtain prior authorization to produce
or sell arms or other instruments of war. Id. § 9.06[2] at 9-54.3.
144. Although not necessarily for national security purposes. See id. § 1.03 at 1-8 to 1-11.
145. THE FUTURES GROUP, THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL PRACTICES ON THE
U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY 5.4 (1985).
146. NEC now owns 4.7% of Groupe Bull and IBM owns 5.7%. Jonathon B. Levine, Look
Who's Helping Defend Fortress Europe, Bus. WK., Feb. 17, 1992, at 131.
147. Stanley Reed, International Outlook: Global Wrapup, Bus. WK., Feb. 10, 1992, at 43.
148. Levine, supra note 146, at 131. For a historical view of the relationship between Groupe
Bull (then Machines Bull) with U.S. investors, see ALLAN W. JOHNSTONE, UNITED STATES
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRENCH CHARGES (1965).
149. Bairstow, supra note 142, at 112; Catherine Arnst, Bull's IBMAlliance Stirs European
Controversy, REUTER BUS. REP., Feb. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, International Library,
ALLWLD File.
150. For a contrary view, see TREVOR TAYLOR & KEITH HAYWARD, THE U.K. DEFENCE
INDUSTRIAL BASE xiv-xviii (1989). However, see id. at 7-41 for a lengthy discussion of the U.K.
defense industry as an international economic competitor.
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domestic industry and a source of foreign trade.15' As a result, British
foreign investment policy can be viewed more accurately as a national
economic policy than as a national defense policy.
Until 1979, the United Kingdom's primary legislative response to
inward foreign investment was the Exchange Control Act.152 The Act
required government approval for all financial transactions between
residents and non-residents, as well as all transactions between non-
residents in British territory. The major criteria for approval were
twofold: first, the transaction must have given the appearance of a
quid pro quo, that is, it must have been for fair consideration and must
have made an "appropriate" contribution to foreign exchange
reserves; 53 second, the United Kingdom reserved the right to pass
judgment on the "desirability" of the transaction.' 54 While these may
seem daunting requirements,
[t]he Exchange Control Act and the surrounding criteria obviously re-
flect the official attitude toward inward investment. This is one of quali-
fied welcome .... On the other hand, the criteria relating to the finance
of the investment represent a determination not to lose one of its major
advantages, namely the initial gain to foreign exchange reserves.
1 55
Parliament repealed the Exchange Control Act in 1979.156 The
only current governmental control over foreign investment in the
United Kingdom is the Industry Act of 1975.157 This act gives the
British government powers similar to those granted to the U.S. execu-
tive under the Exon-Florio Act, to block transactions that are consid-
ered harmful. One difference, however, is that the Industry Act allows
the government to block transactions that are counter to the "interests
of the United Kingdom," rather than those that "threaten the national
security." To date, no transaction has been blocked under this stat-
ute.'15 While the statutory basis for action has changed, the underly-
151. Among other products, the United Kingdom is renowned for its production of the AV-
8B Harrier Jump Jet, a jet fighter aircraft which is capable of vertical take-offs and landings.
Tom Biesiadny, VISTOL Gets A Lift, AEROSPACE AM., Sept. 1991, at 52. The United States
Marine Corps is a major purchaser of the AV-8B. Marine Corps Receives First of 12 Preproduc-
tion AV-8B Fighter Aircraft, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 23, 1984, at 19.
152. Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 14.
153. U.K. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT ON THE U.K. 177 (1973).
154. Id. at 178.
155. Id. at 180.
156. OECD, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRAC-
TICES IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 30 (1979).
157. Industry Act of 1975, Current Law Stat. Ann. 1957, ch. 68.
158. CLIFFORD CHANCE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, § 47.08[l][c], at 47-
53 (1991). See also macLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 134, at 381-83.
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ing policy remains the same: one of qualified welcome for foreign
direct investment.
C. Comparison
When one compares the direct foreign investment policies of
France and the United Kingdom, France's protectionist attitude has
disadvantaged it in two ways: first, France, to an extent, foreclosed
beneficial direct foreign investment; 5 9 and second, the government
had to capitulate on its tough protectionist stance thereby leaving the
impression of inconsistency.160
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has maintained a flexible
foreign investment policy, reserving its sovereign right to control for-
eign investment, while restraining the exercise of that right in favor of
reaping the benefits of direct foreign investment. The United King-




This Note has shown that the net result of preventing foreign own-
ership of domestic producers of dual-use technology products is dele-
terious to these industries and to the economy as a whole. So what is
the solution? What would happen if foreign ownership of dual-use
technology producers were to become widespread, and the U.S. were
to enter into an armed conflict which called for the productive capac-
ity of those producers to support the war effort? Of course, the real
answer is that the nature of modern armed conflict is such that if a
country is not ready when it starts, it is likely to lose before it can get
ready. 162 Moreover, there is no credible evidence that foreign firms
would fail to supply defense needs; indeed history has shown quite the
opposite.163 U.S. affiliates of foreign firms behave much like their do-
159. SIMEON & AssocIES, supra note 141, at 1-16 to 1-17.
160. Levine, supra note 146, at 131.
161. Indeed, Canada has done exactly that. In 1974 Canada initiated a legislative review of
foreign direct investment designed in large part to discourage foreign, particularly U.S., invest-
ment. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, 1973-1974 S.C. 619 (repealed 1985) (Can.). In
1985, however, it decided that the experiment had failed and enacted the Investment Canada Act
to encourage foreign investment, repealing the Foreign Investment Review Act. Investment
Canada Act, ch. 20, 1985 S.C. 419, 449 para. 46. For a detailed discussion, see Ross B. Leckow
& Ian A. Mallory, The Relaxation of Foreign Investment Restrictions in Canada, 6 FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 1 (1991).
162. But see Jacques N. Gansler, The Defense Industrial Base, in INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
AND DEFENSE PLANNING 105, 114 (Lee D. Olvey et al. eds., 1983).
163. See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 74, at 75-8 1. Graham and Krugman show that
German affiliates of U.S. companies, specifically Ford, supplied the Third Reich during World
War II; and that foreign firms from allied countries can actually help during times of war, as U.S.
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mestic counterparts. 164 But if a defense supply problem were to arise,
one 165 solution, drastic though it may seem, would be to nationalize
the relevant industry. 166 There is abundant world precedent for such
an action, 167 and the president has the explicit statutory authority to
nationalize industries under the Defense Production Act of 1950.168
Nowhere today is the right of a sovereign state to take private property
seriously disputed. Through the entire political spectrum from commu-
nism to capitalism, there is general agreement that "a state has, as a
matter of domestic jurisdiction, the power to take property in its control
for securing the common good of the state."1 69
Nationalizing industry is a drastic step,'17  and the United States
has a strong tradition against such nationalization. 171 Moreover, na-
tionalizing industry during wartime would be costly, in light of the
U.S. commitment to the "Hull Doctrine"'172 and the advent of the
United Nations' Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
firms helped the United Kingdom during World War II. However, U.S. firms did purposely stall
Japan's development of its oil industry in the period before World War II and, for non-defense
reasons, declined to contribute to Germany's synthetic rubber production industry.
164. Graham and Krugman show that the only discernible difference between foreign and
U.S. firms is that foreign firms, particularly Japanese firms, have a higher propensity to import.
Id. at 60-61. This does, however, raise concern over the foreign affiliates' ability to ensure a
reliable supply of raw materials during wartime. See supra note 107.
165. Doubtless there would be other measures taken short of nationalization, including nego-
tiations with the firm itself, diplomatic negotiations with the firm's country of origin, or even
convincing a United States concern to purchase the foreign firm's U.S. subsidiary. This Note
argues for nationalization as a solution of last resort.
166. Such expropriation would, of course, be subject to any Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BIT) between the states involved. See, e.g., Treaty on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Pro-
tection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, U.S.-Turk., 25 I.L.M. 85 (1986). The United States has
signed BITs with Argentina, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Congo, Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic, Egypt, Grenada, Haiti, Morocco, Panama, Poland, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, and
Zaire. George Bush, Statement Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.
Department of State Dispatch (Jan. 6, 1992). See also Istvan Pogany, Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties: A Comparative Analysis, in CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW (David L.
Perrott & Istvan Pogany eds., 1988).
167. Between World War I and 1974, 187 U.S. companies lost foreign-based assets to expro-
priation. J. FREDERICK TRUITE, EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 14
(1974).
168. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2153, 2061 (1991). See also GAO,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS, at 8 (Mar. 1990)
(GAO/NSIAD-90-94).
169. TRUITr, supra note 167, at 18 (quoting BEN A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1959)).
170. For a general discussion of state constraints on expropriation, see Detlev F. Vagts, For-
eign Investment Risk Reconsidered: The View From the 1980s, 2 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 10-13
(1987).
171. See e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
172. The "Hull Doctrine," based on statements of Secretary of State John J. Hull regarding
Mexican expropriation of U.S. assets in the 1870s, calls for "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation" for state expropriation. See John A. Westbury, Compensation in Cases of Expro-
priation and Nationalization: Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 5 FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 256, 258-68 (1990); Valerie H. Ruttenberg, The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty
Michigan Journal of International Law
(MIGA). 73 This Note does not argue for the nationalization of de-
fense industry in any but the most dire circumstances. In all but the
most exceptional of circumstances a foreign owned, U.S.-based pro-
ducer would continue to supply the DOD as requested. In any event,
however, it is more advantageous from a military perspective to have a
domestic producer that can be nationalized than to have lost all do-
mestic producers during peacetime due to competition in the civilian
market. 174 As explained in detail above, this Note does argue that
vigorous enforcement of the Exon-Florio Amendment, especially in
the case of dual-use technologies, and a fortiori passage and enforce-
ment of the Technology Preservation Act, may reduce the number of
domestic manufacturers of dual-use technologies.
CONCLUSION
Nationalizing industry does not sit well with the American
psyche.175  Protectionism, on the other hand, has a long and proud
tradition-one that has, however, resulted inevitably in thousands of
lives lost abroad for every politician's election it has won at home. 1
76
Just as political isolationism failed as a military strategy before World
War II, economic isolationism is doomed to failure as a military strat-
egy in the coming century.
Perhaps the most eloquent argument against the use of Exon-
Program: Variations on the Model, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 121 (1987). See also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 (1987).
173. For a discussion of the main features of the MIGA Convention, see Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, I FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 1, 13-24 (1986); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, MIGA and the Standards Applicable to Foreign Invest-
ments, 1 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 327 (1986). For a general discussion of international investment
guarantee agreements, see T.M. Ocran, International Investment Guarantee Agreements and Re-
lated Administrative Schemes, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 341 (1988).
174. There is also some concern with regard to which factor of production is actually the
critical link for emergency wartime production. Traditionally, it would clearly be the plants and
equipment, which are easily nationalized. With the advent of high technology, however, it may
be the personnel which is the critical link. If this were true, then the issue would not be who
owns the plant, nor would it be where the plant is located. The issue would be who works at the
plant, what they know, and to whom they are loyal. This problem goes to the very heart of the
U.S. educational system, and its regrettable lack of emphasis on science and technology. Unless
the U.S. government is willing to require oaths of loyalty from every engineer graduating from a
U.S. university (which would clearly be as abhorrent as it would be ineffective), there is no
solution in sight to this problem.
175. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385
(1989). For a contrary view, see ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP:
THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981).
176. At least, in the minds of those who blame American isolationism and the "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policy of the Treaty of Versailles for the massive destruction of World War II. See
Peter Jenkins, New Hampshire: Does Europe Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at A19. For an
empirical analysis of the relationship between levels of foreign trade and the decision to go to
war, see WILLIAM K. DOMKE, WAR AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM 107-39 (1988).
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Florio is based on its ostensible purpose: national defense. The pri-
mary rationale for a strong national defense in the post-war era has
been deterrence. However, the lessons of history teach us that peace-
ful engagement, including trade relations, is the best deterrent to mili-
tary aggression. As Tresury Secretary Nicholas Brady noted, "This
century has taught us two crucial lessons. First that isolationism and
protectionism lead to war and deprivation. And second, that political
engagement and open trade lead to peace and prosperity."' 77 The
political message that the Exon-Florio Amendment sends to the world
is this: free trade is all well and good, but when push comes to shove,
the United States looks out for number one.
The EC is justified in its concern over calls for U.S. protectionism.
The results of such protectionism would harm the EC, would harm
the United States, would harm Japan, and would set a poor example
for other countries who may perceive that they have something to gain
from protectionism. The United States should listen to its own rheto-
ric on free trade, follow the lead of the United Kingdom in foregoing
its sovereign right to regulate direct foreign investment, and heed the
prudent warning of Hippocrates: Above all, do no harm.
177. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady Delivering a Speech of President George Bush at a
Luncheon of the Japanese Welcoming Committee, Tokyo, Japan, Approximately 10:30 PM EST,
Wednesday, Jan. 8, 1992, Fed. News Service (Jan. 9, 1992).
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